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Scientific	  representation	  is	  a	  fast-­‐growing	  topic	  in	  contemporary	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  The	  problem	  
of	   explaining	   how	   science	   represents	   the	  world	   is	   an	   old	   one,	   deeply	   entangled	  with	   the	   issue	   of	  
realism	  and	  the	  problems	  that	  normally	  come	  with	  it	  (from	  reference	  to	  mind	  independence).	  But	  in	  
recent	  times,	  the	  topic	  of	  scientific	  representation	  has	  taken	  a	  life	  of	  its	  own,	  mainly	  because	  of	  the	  
fashionable	   experimentalist	   quarters	   from	  which	   it	   originates.	   Attention	   to	   scientific	   practice	   and	  
how	   scientific	   models	   represent	   phenomena	   raises	   specific	   questions	   about	   the	   very	   nature	   of	  
scientific	  representation,	  and	  the	  difference	  between	  representation	   in	  science	  and	  representation	  
in	  the	  arts.	  
Bas	   van	   Fraassen’s	   book	   is	   the	  most	   up-­‐to-­‐date	   and	   paradigmatic	   expression	   of	   this	   new	  
trend	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  for	  at	   least	  two	  main	  reasons.	  Firstly,	   it	  explicitly	  acknowledges	  the	  
experimentalist	  roots	  of	  the	  problem,	  as	  it	  arises	  in	  the	  contemporary	  literature.	  Measuring	  is	  a	  way	  
of	   representing,	   and	   scientific	   representation	   is	   perspectival	   in	   the	   same	   sense	   as	   Dürer’s	   ‘art	   of	  
measurement’:	  drawing	  in	  perspective	  is	  itself	  a	  measurement	  technique.	  
Second,	   and	   for	   the	   first	   time	   as	   far	   as	   I	   am	   aware,	   van	   Fraassen’s	   book	   clearly	  marks	   a	  
distinction	  between	  the	  problem	  of	  representation	  as	  it	  appears	  in	  the	  sciences,	  and	  as	  it	  appears	  in	  
philosophy.	   In	  particular,	   it	  marks	  a	  distinction	  between	   the	  problem	  as	   it	  originally	  emerged	  with	  
the	  scientific	  revolution	  at	  the	  time	  of	  Copernicus	  and	  Galileo;	  and	  the	  subsequent	  philosophical	  re-­‐
elaboration	  of	  the	  problem	  with	  Descartes,	  whereby	  ‘The	  problem	  initially	  faced	  in	  the	  sciences	  was	  
thus	  transposed	  into	  one	  pertaining	  mind	  and	  matter’	  (275).	  And	  while	  the	  philosophical	  problem	  of	  
the	  external	  world—from	  Descartes,	   to	  Kant,	   to	  Bradley—may	  well	  be	  unsolvable,	  philosophers	  of	  
science	   should	   confine	   their	   attention	   to	   the	   specific	   problem	   of	   explaining	   ‘how	   can	   an	   abstract	  
mathematical	  structure	  represent	  a	  concrete	  physical	  entity?’	  (243),	  which	  leads	  van	  Fraassen	  back	  
to	  some	  classical	  discussions	  about	  empirical	  adequacy	  and	  ‘saving	  the	  phenomena’,	  enriched	  with	  
new	  important	  caveats	  and	  distinctions,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  below.	  
The	  whole	  book	  then,	  as	  I	  see	  it,	  is	  articulated	  around	  these	  two	  main	  themes,	  and	  develops	  
a	  sophisticated,	   intriguing,	  subtle	   line	  of	  argument	  that	  goes	  from	  the	  experimentalist	  roots	  of	  the	  
problem	  of	  scientific	  representation,	  to	  the	  final	  diagnosis	  of	  the	  divide	  between	  philosophy	  and	  the	  
sciences	  on	  this	  specific	  problem.	  Hence	  the	  four	  parts	  into	  which	  the	  book	  is	  divided,	  and	  of	  which	  I	  
can	  only	  offer	  a	  very	  brief	  overview	  below,	  at	   the	  cost	  of	   leaving	  out	  many	  details.	   I	  hope	  at	   least	  
that	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  overview,	  the	  subtle	  line	  of	  argument	  that	  goes	  from	  the	  first	  to	  the	  second	  
aforementioned	  theme	  will	  become	  clear.	  
The	  first	  part,	  consisting	  of	  the	  first	  three	  chapters,	  is	  on	  representation	  itself.	  Going	  back	  to	  
Nelson	   Goodman	   and	   most	   recent	   debates	   on	   scientific	   representation,	   van	   Fraassen	   makes	   the	  
point	   that	   there	   is	   no	   strong	   argument	   to	   ban	   resemblance	   from	   representation.	   If	   anything,	  
representation	   trades	   on	   selective	   resemblances	   for	   their	   usefulness,	   where	   ‘use’	   or	   ‘usefulness’	  
encompasses	   the	   intention	   of	   the	   creator,	   coding	   conventions	   in	   the	   community,	   and	   the	  way	   in	  
which	  the	  audience	  takes	  it,	  among	  other	  things.	  The	  emphasis	  is	  on	  the	  pragmatics,	  more	  than	  on	  
the	   syntax	   or	   semantics	   of	   representation:	   ‘A	   scientific,	   technical,	   or	   artistic	   representation	   is	   an	  
artefact	  …	  something	  constituted	  as	  a	  cultural	  object,	  through	  its	  role	  or	  function,	  bestowed	  upon	  it	  
in	  practice’	  (30).	  Not	  only	  is	  representation	  intentional,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  related	  to	  the	  epistemic	  
intentions	   of	   the	   user.	   It	   is	   also	   perspectival,	   in	   the	   same	   sense	   of	   Alberti’s	   and	   Dürer’s	   pictorial	  
perspective:	   representing	   is	   the	   ‘art	   of	   measuring’,	   i.e.	   of	   using	   machines	   and	   engines	   to	   offer	  
representations	  of	  phenomena	  not	  as	  they	  are,	  but	  as	  they	  appear	  from	  the	  particular	  vantage	  point	  
of	  an	  observer.	  
The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  book	  (chapters	  4–7)	  expands	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  representing	  as	  the	  art	  of	  
measuring.	   This	   is	   the	   part	   of	   the	   book	   that	   fleshes	   out	   the	   experimentalist	   roots	   of	   the	  
contemporary	   problem	   of	   scientific	   representation.	   The	   emphasis	   is	   all	   on	   scientific	   instruments,	  
their	   three	  main	  roles	   (representative,	   imitative,	  and	  productive)	  and	  two	  main	  ways	  of	   looking	  at	  
them:	  either	  as	  engines	  of	  creation	  or	  as	  windows	  upon	  the	  invisible	  world.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  
we	   encounter	   some	   of	   van	   Fraassen’s	   familiar	   discussions	   about	   electron	   microscopes	   and	  
spectroscopes	  creating	   ‘new	  phenomena,	  truly	  humanly	  observable	  phenomena’	  (100),	  as	  opposed	  
to	   being	  windows	   into	   the	  unobservable	   realm.	   The	  discussion	   is	   enriched	  by	   a	   new	  emphasis	   on	  
measurement,	   both	   from	   a	   historical	   perspective	   (going	   back	   to	   Mach	   on	   thermometers,	   and	  
Poincaré	  and	  Einstein	  on	  time	  and	  length	  measurements—chapter	  5)	  and	  from	  a	  philosophical	  one,	  
whereby	   aspects	   of	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘measurement	   outcome’—i.e.	   intentionality,	   indexicality,	   and	  
perspectivity—are	  related	  to	  specific	  kinds	  of	  representation	  (especially	  imaging	  and	  picturing,	  180–
181).	  
It	   is	   in	  this	  context	  that	  van	  Fraassen	  introduces	  a	  new	  take	  on	  a	  classical	  distinction	  of	  his	  
own,	  namely	  the	  distinction	  between	  data	  models	  and	  surface	  models:	  ‘the	  data	  model	  summarizes	  
the	   relative	   frequencies	   found;	   the	   surface	  model	   “smoothes”—in	   fact	   “idealizes”—this	   summary	  
still	   further	  so	  as	  to	  replace	  the	  relative	  frequency	  counts	  by	  measures	  with	  a	  continuous	  range	  of	  
values.	  …	  The	  abstracting	   is	  an	   idealising,	  an	  extrapolation	   to	  a	   form	   that	  could	  not	  be	   reached	   in	  
actual	  practice’	  (167	  and	  172).	  This	  distinction	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  all	  the	  more	  relevant	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  
the	  book,	  in	  particular	  for	  the	  discussion	  on	  structuralism	  that	  occupies	  Part	  III.	  
Indeed,	  in	  the	  following	  Part	  III	  of	  the	  book	  (chapters	  8–11),	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  discussion	  shifts	  
from	   measurement	   as	   representation	   to	   the	   contention	   that	   scientific	   representation	   is	   about	  
structure	   only.	   Through	   a	   historical	   excursus	   via	   Hertz’s	   and	   Boltzmann’s	   Bildtheorie	   to	   Russell’s	  
structuralism,	   and	   from	   Carnap’s	   Aufbau	   to	   Putnam’s	   model-­‐theoretic	   argument	   against	  
metaphysical	  realism,	  van	  Fraassen	  returns	  to	  another	  familiar	  topic	  of	  his	  own,	  namely	  the	  defence	  
of	  an	  empiricist	  version	  of	  structuralism.	  Hertz’s	  problem	  of	  explaining	  ‘just	  how	  do	  those	  “pictures”,	  
those	  mathematical	  constructions,	  represent	  what	  they	  represent?’	   (208)	   is	   the	  same	  problem	  that	  
Newman	   raised	   against	   Russell’s	   structuralism;	   and	   the	   very	   same	   problem	   that	   also	   empiricist	  
structuralism	  ought	  to	  address,	  whereby:	  
Essential	  to	  an	  empiricist	  structuralism	   is	  the	  following	  core	  construal	  of	  the	  slogan	  
that	  all	  we	  know	  is	  structure:	  	  
I.	   Science	   represents	   the	   empirical	   phenomena	   as	   embeddable	   in	   certain	  abstract	  
structures	  (theoretical	  models).	  
II.	  Those	  abstract	  structures	  are	  describable	  only	  up	  to	  structural	  isomorphism.	  …	  	  
Empiricist	   structuralism	   is	  a	  view	  not	  of	  what	  nature	   is	   like	  but	  of	  what	   science	   is.	  
(238)	  
Van	   Fraassen	   uses	   Putnam’s	   model-­‐theoretic	   argument	   to	   fight	   the	   metaphysical	   realist	   view	  
(associated	  with	   the	   correspondence	   theory	   of	   truth)	   claiming	   that	   ‘there	   is	   an	   essentially	   unique	  
privileged	  way	   of	   representing:	   “carving	   nature	   at	   the	   joints”’	   (244).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   he	   uses	  
Putnam’s	  argument	  also	  against	  non-­‐empiricist	  versions	  of	  structuralism	  that	  tend	  to	  forget	  that	  ‘We	  
have	  an	  interpretation	  for	  the	  given	  language	  only	  if	  we	  can	  define	  or	  identify	  such	  a	  function.	  To	  do	  
that	  we	  must	  be	  able	  to	  describe	  both	  the	  function’s	  domain	  and	  its	  range	  …	  .	  As	  long	  as	  we	  are	  not	  
given	  an	  independent	  description	  of	  both	  the	  domain	  and	  the	  range	  of	  the	  interpretation,	  we	  do	  not	  
have	  any	  such	  interpretation,	  nor	  any	  way	  to	  identify	  one’	  (233–234).	  
But	  while	  Putnam,	  led	  by	  the	  model-­‐theoretic	  argument,	  landed	  in	  Kantian	  internal	  realism	  
(until	  the	  pragmatic	  turn	  of	  the	  late	  1980s),	  van	  Fraassen,	  led	  by	  the	  same	  argument,	  opts	  for	  a	  self-­‐
declared	  Wittgensteinian	  move	  with	   an	   emphasis	   on	   the	  use	  of	   theories	   and	   representation	   (see	  
235),	   in	  continuity	  with	  the	  pragmatics	  of	  scientific	  representation	  discussed	  in	  Part	  I.	  But	  how	  can	  
such	  a	  Wittgensteinian	  move	  help	  us	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  explaining	  ‘how,	  or	  in	  what	  sense,	  can	  
such	   an	   abstract	   entity	   as	   a	   model	   “save”	   or	   fail	   to	   “save”	   this	   concrete	   phenomenon?’	   (245).	  
Moreover,	  if	  ‘saving	  the	  phenomena’	  implies	  embedding	  data	  models	  into	  theoretical	  models,	  both	  
of	   which	   are	   abstract	   structures,	   then	   ‘doesn’t	   a	   reflection	   that	   focuses	   on	   the	   data	   model	   for	  
assessing	  empirical	  adequacy,	  lose	  contact	  with	  reality	  altogether?’	  (246).	  	  
We	  reach	  here	  what	  in	  my	  view	  is	  the	  most	  interesting	  part	  of	  the	  book,	  where	  the	  previous	  
discussion	   on	   the	   pragmatics	   of	   representation	   and	   on	   measurement	   as	   representation	   come	  
together	  and	  some	  classical	  tenets	  of	  van	  Fraassen’s	  constructive	  empiricism	  are	  revisited.	  The	  self-­‐
declared	   ‘Wittgensteinian	   move’	   (254)	   consists	   then	   in	   the	   following:	   ‘the	   theory	   to	   phenomena	  
relation	  displayed	  here	  is	  an	  embedding	  of	  one	  mathematical	  structure	  in	  another	  one.	  For	  the	  data	  
model—or,	   more	   accurately,	   the	   surface	   model—which	   represents	   the	   appearances,	   is	   itself	   a	  
mathematical	  structure	  …	  .	  Construction	  of	  a	  data	  model	  is	  precisely	  the	  selective	  relevant	  depiction	  
of	   the	   phenomena	  by	   the	   user	   of	   the	   theory	   required	   for	   the	   possibility	   of	   representation	   of	   the	  
phenomenon	  …	   .	   There	   is	   nothing	   in	   an	   abstract	   structure	   itself	   that	   can	   determine	   that	   it	   is	   the	  
relevant	  data	  model,	  to	  be	  matched	  by	  the	  theory’	  (252–253).	  
By	  shifting	  attention	  to	  the	  user-­‐dependent	  notion	  of	  scientific	  representation,	  van	  Fraassen	  
can	  maintain:	  
For	  us	  the	  claims	  
(A)	  that	  the	  theory	  is	  adequate	  to	  the	  phenomena	  and	  the	  claim	  
(B)	  that	  it	  is	  adequate	  to	  the	  phenomena	  as	  represented,	  i.e.	  as	  represented	  by	  us	  
	  are	  indeed	  the	  same!	  That	  (A)	  and	  (B)	  are	  the	  same	  for	  us	  is	  a	  pragmatic	  tautology.	  
(259)	  
And	  again:	  ‘in	  a	  context	  in	  which	  a	  given	  model	  is	  someone’s	  representation	  of	  a	  phenomenon,	  there	  
is	   for	   that	   person	  no	  difference	  between	   the	  question	  whether	   the	   theory	   fits	   that	   representation	  
and	  the	  question	  whether	  that	  theory	  fits	  the	  phenomena’	  (260).	  
Having	  taken	  this	  crucial	  pragmatic	  step,	   in	  the	  final	  Part	  IV,	  van	  Fraassen	  finally	  returns	  to	  
the	  issue	  of	  realism.	  As	  anticipated	  above,	  in	  this	  final	  part	  of	  the	  book	  he	  explores	  the	  parting	  of	  the	  
way	  in	  the	  problem	  of	  representation	  as	  it	  emerged	  in	  the	  sciences	  with	  Galileo,	  and	  as	  it	  was	  later	  
reinterpreted	   by	   Descartes	   and	   other	   philosophers	   as	   the	   ‘problem	   of	   the	   external	   world’.	   By	  
building	   up	   on	   the	   previous	  user-­‐dependent,	  perspectival	   analysis	   of	   scientific	   representation,	   van	  
Fraassen	  now	  introduces	  a	  new	  distinction	  between	  appearances	  and	  phenomena:	  ‘Phenomena	  are	  
observable,	   but	   their	   appearance,	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   what	   they	   look	   like	   in	   given	   measurement	   or	  
observation	  set-­‐ups	   is	   to	  be	  distinguished	  from	  them	  as	  much	  as	  any	  person’s	  appearance	   is	   to	  be	  
distinguished	   from	   that	   person’	   (284).	   Appearances	   are	   simply	   the	   contents	   of	   measurement	  
outcomes,	   and	   should	   not	   be	   confused	   with	   what	   philosophers	   sometimes	   calls	   ‘appearances’,	  
namely	  subjectively	  experienced	  impressions	  (see	  276).	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  phenomena	  are	  observable	  things	  and	  events	  in	  the	  world:	  they	  are	  the	  
‘smelly,	   colourful,	   noisy	   things’	  which	   are	   real	   (276).	   A	   paradigmatic	   example	   is	   how	  Copernicus’s	  
theory	   saved	   the	   ‘phenomenon’	   of	   Mercury’s	   motion,	   by	   showing	   how	   the	   ‘appearance’	   of	   its	  
retrograde	  motion	   could	   be	   derived	   (via	   kinematics	   and	   optics)	   from	  what	   Copernicus	   postulated	  
about	  Mercury’s	  motion.	  One	  may	   also	  be	   tempted	   to	   equate	   van	   Fraassen’s	   distinction	  between	  
appearances	  and	  phenomena	  to	  the	  previous	  distinction	  between	  data	  models	  and	  surface	  models,	  
although	  van	  Fraassen	  does	  not	  do	  this	  explicitly.	  The	  bottom	  line	   is	  that	  reality	  consists	  of	  smelly,	  
colourful,	  noisy	  (observable)	  phenomena	  (not	  Kantian	  things-­‐in-­‐themselves,	  nor	  a	  Cartesian	  external	  
world),	  while	  appearances	  are	  the	  way	  phenomena	   ‘look	   like’	   in	  a	  given	  measurement	  set-­‐up,	  and	  
hence	  from	  a	  particular	  vantage	  point	  (as	  in	  Dürer’s	  pictorial	  perspective).	  We	  ‘save	  phenomena’	  by	  
embedding	   perspectival	   appearances	   (as	   given	   by	   a	   certain	   instrument,	   measurement	   set-­‐up,	   or	  
frequencies	   in	  a	  data	  model)	   into	  another	  abstract	  structure,	   the	  surface	  model,	  which	   ‘smoothes’	  
and	   ‘idealises’	   the	   measurement	   outcomes,	   and	   eventually	   embed	   the	   surface	   model	   into	  
theoretical	  models,	  such	  as	  for	  example	  Copernicus’s	  geometric	  models	  in	  astronomy.	  
This	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  book	  does	  not	  do	  justice	  to	  the	  complexity,	  details,	  and	  nuances	  of	  
it.	   But	   I	   hope	   it	   suffices	   to	   give	   an	   idea	   of	   the	   fascinating	   journey	   that	   goes	   from	   a	   serious	   re-­‐
appraisal	   of	   the	   role	   of	   scientific	   instruments	   in	   artistic	   and	   scientific	   representation,	   to	   the	  more	  
general	  issue	  of	  how	  science	  represents	  nature,	  and	  how	  its	  modalities	  and	  operations	  should	  not	  be	  
conflated	  with	  the	  philosopher’s	  problem	  of	  the	  external	  world,	  according	  to	  van	  Fraassen.	  This	  is	  a	  
book	  with	  an	  important	  and	  intricate	  story	  to	  tell,	  and	  it	  does	  it	  with	  so	  much	  attention	  to	  historical,	  
philosophical,	   scientific,	   and	   even	   artistic	   details	   that	   makes	   it	   an	   occasion	   for	   a	   thousand	   wider	  
meditations.	  
